

Naval War College Review

Volume 17
Number 2 *February*

Article 1

1964

February 1964 Full Issue

The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Naval War College, The U.S. (1964) "February 1964 Full Issue," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 17 : No. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol17/iss2/1>

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

VOL. XVI, NO. 6

FEBRUARY 1964

CONTENTS

JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE FREE WORLD	1
Professor Chitoshi Yanaga	
THE NATURE AND USE OF POWER AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON STATE GOALS AND STRATEGIES	18
Dr. Hans J. Morgenthau	
Recommended Reading	31



SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE READER

The material contained herein is for the professional education of officers of the naval service. The frank remarks and personal opinions are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted. It shall not be republished or quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with both the author and the Naval War College.

Naval War College Review was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits of the resident students at the Naval War College. It must be kept in the possession of the subscriber, or other commissioned officer and should be destroyed by burning when no longer required.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
REVIEW

Issued Monthly
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE FREE WORLD

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 10 October 1963

by

Professor Chitoshi Yanaga

I have just recently returned from a ten months' stay in Japan, which gave me a marvelous opportunity to feel the pulse of the nation, so to speak, to meet and speak to leaders in the fields of business, finance, government, and politics, and also to observe at firsthand the great surge of energy and zest of creative talent that is transforming the country. One wonders if this is the same nation that only 18 years ago suffered utter defeat and lay prostrate. I came away more convinced than ever that Japan's tremendous energy, skilled manpower, and scientific-technical know-how constitute a powerful constructive force in the development and regeneration of Asian countries that are struggling desperately to modernize and industrialize themselves, and in counteracting the disruptive forces of communism that are obstructing the peaceful development of their economy and political institutions.

Tokyo, the world's largest metropolis of more than ten million, is now in the throes of a gigantic face-lifting operation unprecedented in the history of Japan and, indeed perhaps in the recent history of the world. The incessant staccato sound of pneumatic drills and hammers reverberates even in the stillness of the night throughout the length and breadth of the city as workmen labor around the clock. Streets are torn up by excavations as new subway lines are being built, and the famous Ginza, which is Tokyo's equivalent of New York's Broadway and 42nd Street, gives the appearance of a city that is being rebuilt anew after a major disaster.

Tokyo reminds one of a young debutante frantically putting on her expensive finery and makeup while her first important date waits impatiently downstairs to take her to a gala coming-out party—a once-in-a-lifetime affair. Everything in Tokyo is geared to the Olympics of next October. Work is going on frantically though methodically on the completion of the Olympic Stadium, high-rise apartment houses, business buildings, luxury hotels,

modern supermarkets, a sewage system, wide avenues, and a monorail, as well as an expressway, linking the airport with the center of Tokyo. Skeptics wonder if the Japanese will ever make it, but the Japanese themselves, and long-time foreign residents, confidently give assurance that everything will be ready.

Japan is sensitively aware that the eyes of the world are on her. She wants to present herself in the best possible light, just as anxiously and expectantly as the nervous debutante who intensely hopes to be the belle of the ball. The Olympic Games, in effect, will be Japan's long-awaited international coming-out party and she wants very badly to show the world the amazing economic comeback, and the incredible industrial growth, she has achieved in the few short years since the end of World War II.

* * * * *

The ratification by the United States only three days ago of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which has already been signed by 103 nations, and the favorable reception by Russia of President Kennedy's proposal of a joint Soviet-American expedition to the moon, had the effect of easing the cold war tension considerably and have improved the prospects of peace. But as the President pointed out, it is only the first step in a long and difficult road over which we must travel before we can hope for a durable peace.

Trouble spots still continue to plague us, especially in Asia. South Vietnam presents the worst kind of headache for the Free World as the Diem Government resorts to violence and oppressive methods. The situation is going from bad to worse although the Free World has not written it off as a lost cause. The White House statement issued on the 2nd that 'the political situation in South Vietnam remains deeply serious' has a hollow ring and is not at all reassuring. The creation of an independent Malaysia last month has brought in its wake, open and hostile opposition from Indonesia whose ire has been directed at the British, resulting in the burning and destruction of the British Embassy in Jakarta, and completely cutting off trade with Malaysia. President Sukarno has pledged to fight and destroy the new federation and he makes no secret of his desire to drive all British and American influence from the area. The situation in South Korea is far from reassuring for, although the military coup d'etat ousted the corrupt regime, it has not brought political stability or improved economic conditions. In spite of repeated declarations from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the condition of Taiwan does not permit optimism, for its

position of strength does not seem to be improving with the passage of time. If anything, there is evidence that it is deteriorating.

Against this backdrop of turbulence and instability in most of Asia, Japan appears by contrast to be exceedingly composed, tranquil, stable, and vigorously and constructively active and productive. Thus, only 18 years after the most disastrous defeat, and inexorably as the result of world conditions, destiny has forced Japan to become one of the few nations that could play decisive roles in the world.

In recent months, it has become clear that the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union has eased and is no longer as great as it was a year ago, and certainly not as great as that which has since developed between China and the Soviet Union. This situation has led to the enhancement of Japan's position as an ally of the Free World and particularly of the United States, making it possible for her to play her roles more effectively, and to the greater advantage of the Free World as well as herself.

What then are the roles that Japan can and will play? To some observers of the current scene, it appears as though Japan is at present timidly seeking her identity, not knowing exactly what roles she should play. Yet to those who have been following the events of the past few years, it has become increasingly clear that she has chosen the roles of trader, donor-developer, and staunch advocate of peace, for these roles are consistent with her national goals which are the achievement of economic viability that will insure a high standard of living, peaceful existence as a nation that has renounced war as a means of settling international disputes, and rendering technical and economic assistance to the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In working to achieve these goals, Japan has repeatedly reiterated that she is determined to function at all times as a member of the United Nations and within its framework, but particularly in close cooperation and collaboration with the United States. She has adopted trade as an instrument of friendly and peaceful intercourse with all nations. Her proffer of assistance to the developing nations is not made as an act of pure altruism, but rather as a sensible and practical policy of enlightened selfishness, of helping herself by helping others.

What, then, are Japan's capabilities and how well is she equipped to play the roles that have been thrust upon her by internal needs and conditions, as well as international circumstances and requirements?

Ironically, as Japan lay prostrate in 1945 following utter defeat and exhaustion, some high echelon policymakers in the United States were actually planning for the end of Japan's industrial supremacy in Asia by stripping her of her industrial plants. The now all-but-forgotten Pauley Report was a recommendation of this sort which tended to be more vindictive than realistic or statesmanlike. But Japan was spared such a fate, not because she was able to thwart it, but because wisdom, foresight, and realism prevailed. The United States came to realize that a balance of power in Asia and the Pacific must be based on a prosperous, healthy, and defensively strong Japan. The implementation of the Pauley recommendations was never carried out. Instead, Japan's economic recovery was pushed ahead vigorously, beginning in 1948, and Japan was designated the workshop of Asia in the implementation of American policy in the Far East.

The fall of Nationalist China to the communists in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 underscored the urgency of a revitalized Japan which served effectively as a staging area, base of operations, and supply base for United Nations action. All sorts of services necessary for military operations were rendered by Japan. Without the utilization of Japan's land, skill and productive capacity, successful United Nations action in Korea would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible. Unexpectedly, the Korean War gave tremendous impetus to industrial production and hastened Japan's economic recovery, as United States procurements served as an effective shot in the arm for Japan's economy at a time it was badly needed.

By 1957 economic recovery was complete, and the country enjoyed a boom such as had never before been experienced. In fact, it was hailed as the greatest boom since the beginning of Japan's history. Thus, within a space of slightly over a decade, Japan had risen from the ashes of war and destruction to regain once again her position as one of the foremost industrial and trading nations of the world. Her speedy recovery has been one of the economic miracles of the postwar era.

Japan's annual growth rate in gross national product, which is one of the highest in the world today, reached 15% in 1961.

Alarmed by this spectacular growth, the government has since decided to slow down the growth rate to around nine percent. At the end of the war, Japan's steel industry had come to a virtual standstill. But it has been revived rapidly, and productive capacity has increased fourfold to become the fourth in the world, surpassing both Britain and France. At the present rate of expansion, it is not unlikely that before long it may surpass West Germany to become the world's third producer. Her present annual production of 35 million tons is almost as much as that of the rest of Asia, Latin America, and Africa put together. It is approximately double the capacity of Communist China. By 1970, production is estimated to reach 45-50 million tons, but at the present rate of growth, the 1970 target may well be reached in the 1960's.

This tremendous growth of Japan's steel industry has resulted in exports to the United States and other Western nations. A very high level of technology has been achieved by the Japanese who claim the highest pig iron yield per unit of coke. The steel industry has reached the point where it is able to export steel technology and plants to other parts of the world. The first steel mill in Pakistan is now being built in Chittagong with a \$55 million credit loan and equipment from Japan. On May 23, the Japan Export-Import Bank extended a \$15 million loan to India for the purchase of Japanese equipment for the construction of a special steel and alloy plant in Durgapur. There is a joint Japanese-Brazilian plant in operation, and plans are under way for similar plants in Hong Kong and Singapore.

Before World War II, Japan ranked third in the world as a naval and maritime power. During the war, practically all of her merchant marine, as well as naval ships, were sent to the bottom. But she has rapidly rebuilt her merchant fleet to achieve fifth place in the world, but with a tonnage far in excess of what she had before the war.

Without any question, the most spectacular achievement in the postwar period has been in shipbuilding. In 1956, only 11 years after the defeat, Japan captured the leading position as the world's shipbuilder and has maintained this position ever since. In 1960, she built 1,731,000 tons, or 21% of the total world tonnage of 8,340,000 tons. Since 1958 she has built several huge oil tankers of over 100,000 tons, including the mammoth 130,000-ton *Nissho Maru* of the Idemitsu Oil Co., which is the prime importer of oil from Kuwait. In 1962,

Japanese shipyards had contracts for building freighters, tankers, fishing vessels, patrol boats, etc., for Rumania, Greece, Peru, Kuwait, South Korea, and the Soviet Union, to mention a few. In October 1962, the Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy Industries delivered the world's fastest freighter, the *Yamanashi Maru*, to the NYK Line. This 11,000-ton automated freighter, carrying a crew of only 47, developed a trial run speed of 23.64 knots and will run at a speed of 20.7 knots with a full load, cutting the normal Kobe-Hamburg run of 36 days by three full days.

Japan has gone in for push-button freighters in a big way. The dream of Japanese shipbuilders—operating 10,000-ton freighters by remote control with a complement of from 35 to 40 officers and crewmen—has become a reality. The first of the three ships constructed was the 12,172-ton *Yamatoshi Maru* built at a cost of 1.2 billion yen or \$3.3 million and carrying a complement of only 37.

Japan's bicycle industry now leads the world. In 1962 it produced 3,210,000 units which was equal to the combined output of Great Britain (2 million) and West Germany (1.2 million). The USSR came second with 3 million and the United States third with 2.8 million.

Another field in which Japan leads the world is fishing, with an annual catch in excess of six million tons. Her up-to-date fishing fleets, equipped with sonar and other electronics devices, as well as refrigeration and canning facilities, range far and wide, in the North Pacific, South Pacific, Antarctic, and the Atlantic in the Azores and off the southern tip of Africa. Crab-fishing ships in the North Pacific are actually floating canneries which bring back canned crab ready for the export market.

Speaking before the national Diet in September 1961, Prime Minister Ikeda told the members of the House of Representatives that Japan had reached a point where she must shoulder heavy responsibilities in the securing of world peace, both as a member of the family of free nations and as a member of the Asian-African group. Two years later, on September 13th of this year, he emphasized that Japan would aid the growth of newly developing nations to the fullest extent of her national capacity.

For some time now, Japan has been engaged actively in giving technical assistance to the countries of South and Southeast Asia. Japanese scientists, chemists, engineers, technicians, and

experts of all kinds have been going to Asian countries to assist in building dams, irrigation projects, electric power plants, fertilizer plants, factories, and ships. Latest fishing equipment and methods are being introduced, and agricultural experts are helping to increase production. In India, with the help of Japanese experts in rice culture, the yield has been increased to the point of breaking the record formerly held by Japan.

Through reparations agreements with the countries of South-east Asia, Japan has been offering aid in technology, capital, and joint enterprises. Japan participates in the Colombo Plan and she is the only Asian country participating as a donor nation. All other Asian nations are recipients of aid. She is also one of the influential members of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

As of May 1963, according to Japanese government sources, there were ten major projects in various stages of negotiations—from agreements already concluded to those pending. These were a special steel mill, a fertilizer plant, and a rayon pulp plant for India; a steel mill, a streptomycin plant, and an agricultural chemical plant for Pakistan; a bamboo pulp mill and a fertilizer plant for Indonesia; electrification of 133 kilometers of railroad in Argentina at a cost of \$100 million; and a \$28 million fertilizer plant in Uruguay.

On May 23, an agreement was signed in Ghana whereby Japan will establish a technical training center to give guidance in the manufacture of dyes, cotton textiles, and towels. This joint project is based on the Japan-Ghana economic and technical co-operation agreement of September 1962, and is the first of its kind concluded by Japan with an African nation. Japan will send engineers to help in the training of local personnel and provide cotton fabrics, yarn machinery, and other equipment, free of charge over a period of three years at an estimated cost to Japan of \$361,000.

Japan's overseas investments now are in excess of \$2 billion and include, among others, an oil company in Arabia; shipbuilding, cotton spinning, and a steel mill, all in Brazil; a pulp mill in Alaska, a chemical plant in Pennsylvania, a nickel plant in Rhodesia; and sewing machine and radio-television plants in Ireland.

Japan regards her main role to be in the field of economic development. In this she is giving an ever-increasing emphasis to the contribution she can make toward economic development in other countries, both through the United Nations and outside it. At the same time, the promotion of trade is being pushed vigorously in an effort to find adequate markets for her products, for indeed, Japan literally must trade or perish.

The Flag of the Rising Sun is now seen in the trading ports of the world as Japanese ships ply the seven seas, carrying the products of her factories to the far corners of the earth. Japanese merchandise is a familiar sight in the emporiums of the principal cities of Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle East, Latin America, and the United States. Leading Japanese department stores have established branches overseas to increase outlets for manufactured goods. Here in the United States three department stores are already represented in Honolulu, Los Angeles, and New York. Especially well known of the Japanese products are the electronics products, radio and television sets, especially the transistorized ones, optical instruments, cameras, microscopes, and telescopes. Nikon and Canon cameras, Sony TV's, and National Panasonic transistor radios have become household words in America.

Japan's experience and achievements in industrial modernization are an eloquent testimony to the fact that economic progress can be achieved successfully without the help of communist ideology or techniques and they give the lie to communism's assertion that the communist way is the best, if not the only, way to rapidly develop Asian nations.

Japan today is the most industrialized and modernized nation in Asia. As a matter of fact, economically and industrially, Japan is far in advance of some of the Western nations. Because of this, economists no longer classify Japan as an Asian nation, but place her alongside Western industrialized nations. This places Japan in a uniquely advantageous position as an intermediary in introducing the benefits of modern Western techniques and technology, not directly from the West, but through modifications and adaptations that have been worked out in Japan in the modernization process which has been going on for more than a century.

Naturally, as a partner of Asian and African nations, their aspirations, hopes, fears, and problems resulting from their being catapulted suddenly into a 20th-century world of advanced

technology, are more easily seen, felt, and understood by Japan, for she can look back at her own struggles not so long ago when she resolved to catch up with the West and share the fruits and benefits of modern technology. Consequently, the Japanese are able to mitigate the clash between traditional ways and the technology of the 20th century and harmonize and reconcile the contradictions. Thus, they are in a position to offer modernization and industrialization of the kind more suited psychologically and physically to Asian requirements which have not yet achieved a high degree of sophistication. Asian countries today represent a wide range in stages of development or underdevelopment, all the way from the most primitive type of agricultural production and way of life which have not changed noticeably in the last 1,000 years, to the advanced stages of industrial production such as one sees in some segments of India's economy.

The Japanese can thus serve as a sort of buffer and shock absorber in the transplanting of Western techniques in the transitional stages of economic development much more realistically and successfully than can Americans or, for that matter, Westerners in general. Furthermore they could do this much more imperceptibly or without attracting attention or suspicion, for the Japanese could hardly be made to appear as symbols or agents of Western imperialism.

* * * * *

One of the major problems of American policy is the defense of Japan. In 1950, Japan became an important part of the United States defense perimeter in the Western Pacific, which extends in an arc from the Aleutians down to the Philippines. In the long-range communist plan of domination and control of Asia, Japan is the primary target. In spite of this danger, Japan has not built up her military strength to the level deemed adequate for her defense, notwithstanding United States assistance and persistent prodding.

Slowly, however, Japan has been building up her defense forces until today her ground, air and maritime self-defense forces total a quarter of a million, comprising 13 ground divisions, 800 American-designed jet fighters, and a navy of two dozen destroyers and six submarines, and plans for helicopter carriers. She possesses no nuclear arms, which she prefers not to own, nor does she permit the United States to bring nuclear warheads into Japan. At the present time, she is capable of a holding action for 30 days

against a conventional invasion force. For her security, she depends on the military might of the United States through the United States-Japan Security Treaty which was signed in January 1960, and she prefers to keep it this way for some time. Nevertheless, Japan remains the Far Eastern bastion against communism, and as such she contributes toward the security plans of the United States.

The Japanese public is in an antimilitary, antirearmament, and antiwar mood, for the disastrous defeat and its consequences, as well as the two nuclear blasts, are still very much in mind. The bad dream of the period of military domination before and during the war still haunts them. Japan has officially disavowed and renounced the use of military force as a means of settling international disputes or achieving national goals. This is unequivocally stated in Article IX of the postwar Constitution.

Japan has become increasingly fearful of involvement in a war, which to her seems almost certainly to be a nuclear war. Consequently, she is hypersensitive about rearmament, which in the minds of the people is equated with war. The people are afraid that the American bases may drag them into Southeast Asia's troubles. As a result, the Japanese government has been unable to push ahead a rearmament program in the face of hostile public opinion led by the socialists, intellectuals, and housewives, even though it recognizes the need for stronger defense.

Because of this deeply imbedded antirearmament attitude, there does not seem to be a possibility of Japan possessing in the near future the kind of military power that would be more than defensive. This should not materially affect, much less negate, the effectiveness of Japan's participation as a partner of the Free World, inasmuch as under present conditions, she will not, and should not, be expected to play a military role for the Free World. It is my opinion that an attempt to build up and use Japan's military strength would backfire and actually work to the detriment of the Free World's cause, particularly if it is undertaken in the face of unfavorable public opinion.

If Communist China is to be contained, it cannot primarily be by military means. It is more important that the methods be economic, that is, through the improvement of economic conditions in those countries of Asia that are vulnerable to communist penetration and subversion. In other words, it should be through the erection of effective economic barriers against communism.

Such economic barriers to forestall communism, however, will have no meaning without the development of an arrangement between the United States and Japan approaching a Pacific Union. If the Japanese are to move vigorously ahead to the risks of developmental responsibilities in Asia, they must have the security of knowing that their major market in the United States is not only stable, but expansive. The United States may even have to lower trade barriers to the point where some of the industries will inevitably suffer, and steps will have to be taken for some kind of division-of-labor production agreements between the two countries.

To enable Japan to move into the arena of risk and responsibility as a partner, her Western allies will have to give her the security of full economic and political partnership rather than a second class partnership. In other words, the Western World has to move over and make a little bit more room for Japan. It is imperative also that Japan's future production, capabilities, inventiveness, and desires for a world role be integrated into the framework of the noncommunist world. Needless to say, the Japanese should be made to believe firmly that they are truly full partners both in name and in fact.

Japan's revulsion against nuclear war is understandable since she is the only nation to actually experience its horrors. Her efforts ever since 1956 when she was admitted to membership in the United Nations have been directed unremittingly toward the banning of nuclear tests. It was therefore with unconcealed satisfaction that on August 14, the 18th anniversary of the surrender in World War II, that Japan signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. At the signing in Washington, the Japanese Ambassador Takeuchi declared that Japan, in cooperation with the other nations of the world, will continue to do her utmost toward the cessation of all nuclear testing.

With regard to the problem of utilizing nuclear energy for purposes other than war, Japan's attitude is enlightened. Japan's favorable attitude in respect to the peaceful use of atomic energy dates back to 1955 when the United States Atomic Energy Commission helped to set up in Tokyo an exhibit demonstrating the many peaceful uses of atomic energy. Japan saw clearly the advantages of this particular type of energy as a solution to her fuel problem, which has been one of the major stumbling blocks in her highly industrialized economy for she has no fuel resources of her own.

Starting with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1955, Japan has pushed forward her program of research and development. In 1956, the Atomic Energy Research Institute was set up at a 900-acre research center at Tokai Village some 80 miles northeast of Tokyo, where nuclear scientists and engineers are carrying on their research and development projects to harness the atom for industrial purposes. Sometime this month, electricity generated by nuclear energy is scheduled for use for the first time at the Atomic Energy Research Institute.

Earlier this year, the Atomic Ship Development Agency was set up and plans are now being drawn up for a 6500-ton oceanographic survey ship equipped with a light water-cooled and moderated reactor with a thermal output of 35,000 kilowatts and driving a 10,000 horsepower steam turbine which will power the ship for a year without refueling. The ship, with a speed of 17.75 knots, is expected to be completed in seven years and will be manned by a crew of 125, including 50 scientists and specialists, and will operate in the polar regions. At present Japan is the only Asian country that is putting nuclear energy to peaceful use. According to the Japan Atomic Energy Industrial Congress, radioactive isotopes, the by-products of atomic reactors, are being utilized to an increasing degree in the fields of medicine, agriculture and industry. A total of 951 institutions and industrial plants are now utilizing radioactive isotopes.

From the Japanese point of view, there is not the slightest doubt that trade is the most important cornerstone on which American-Japanese partnership is based. In this connection, it is most encouraging that Japanese exports to the United States in 1962 reached an all-time record of \$1.4 billion, which represented a 31% increase over the preceding year, while imports from the United States reached \$1.8 billion. American-Japanese trade in 1962 conformed to the world trend of rapidly increasing trade among developed nations through the exchange of industrial goods. More than one third of Japan's exports to the United States consisted of machinery, optical equipment, metal products, transistors and other sophisticated industrial products which have replaced textiles as leading exports. Machinery was among the most important categories of United States exports to Japan. There was a 12% increase in United States export of machinery, indicating the extent to which Japanese industry is dependent on United States for capital equipment. Total sales of United States agricultural products amounted to \$482 million. The Japanese apparently developed a sudden and tremendous taste

for American-made instant coffee, for in 1962 they bought \$12.5 million worth, which was a 79% increase over that of the preceding year. Japan was again the American farmers' best market for soybeans in 1962, to the tune of \$104 million. American consumer goods continue to grow in popularity, and even photographic equipment was purchased by Japan to the amount of \$10.8 million.

Prospects are bright for Japanese-American trade for indications are that United States exports are expected to continue to increase. It is predicted that Japan, the second best customer of the United States next to Canada, will be buying about \$3 billion annually by the end of the 1960's, which is more than double the 1962 volume. This will be the result of the government's 10-year income-doubling plan. Increase in Japanese exports to the United States must follow as a matter of course, for she must sell in the American market to earn the dollars needed to pay for the increasing volume of purchases from the United States. This mutually beneficial trade relation, however, can be maintained and promoted only if continual efforts are made by both countries to reduce or eliminate artificial trade restrictions.

That the trade relations between the United States and Japan are of overriding importance in the maintenance of the existing partnership of these two great Pacific powers was demonstrated in the talks between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ikeda on June 20-21, 1961 in Washington. The upshot of it was the formation of a joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in accord with the United States-Japan Treaty signed on January 19, 1960, for the purpose of strengthening the American-Japanese partnership and to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, encourage economic collaboration and promote the flow of trade between the two countries.

Accordingly, the United States Secretaries of State, Treasury, Interior, Commerce, and Labor met with their counterparts, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agriculture and Forestry, International Trade and Industry, Labor and the Director General of Economic Planning at Hakone, Japan in early November. As an editorial of *The New York Times* of November 2, 1961 pointed out, this was 'the first time an American President has sent so many members of his Cabinet abroad on a single mission,' attesting to the importance of trade relations between the two nations.

'In Japanese-American as in world trade relations' *The New York Times* continued, 'the United States-Japan Conference this week can be a milestone of progress.' The work of this unprecedented high cabinet level joint working committee was aided materially by the favorable political background created by the Soviet Union's series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere which had caused great jitters in Japan. The meeting underscored 'the strong ties between the leader of the Western alliance and the strongest industrial power in the Far East.'

The Japanese Government has repeatedly assured her ally, the United States, that it does not intend to develop trade with Communist China at the risk of injuring trade with the free nations. There are some 80 firms presently doing business with China. Why? There are at least three reasons for this: First is the belief that some day China will be a major market for Japan. In the prewar period, Japan had been dependent on the Chinese mainland for most of her raw materials and enjoyed a very profitable trade relationship. Second is the fear that Western European countries will move into the China market and permanently squeeze out Japan. Third is their willingness to take losses and tolerate Peiping's political line in the hope that one day the Communist Government will give whopping orders. There are those who feel, however, that trade with Communist China will never amount to anything substantial and therefore it would not be worth the trouble. But there is a widespread feeling on the part of business that if profitable trade with Communist China could be worked out without any political strings attached, it should certainly be attempted.

Last August, the sale of a \$20 million synthetic textile plant to Communist China on a 5-year-deferred-payment plan was concluded. This deal has been criticized by some foreign critics as a form of economic aid, but Prime Minister Ikeda has stated flatly that it was a business transaction, pure and simple, by a private firm.

While Japan would never tolerate infiltration by international communism, she does not want to neglect the cultivation of friendly relations with the communist nations. The Japanese Government feels that some sort of *modus vivendi* with Communist China ought to be possible and should be worked out eventually. It is convinced that a catastrophic, global, nuclear war would be the height of madness since it would not settle international differences but would result only in total annihilation.

Prime Minister Ikeda believes it would be desirable to gradually improve relations with mainland China through mutual respect for each other's position and on the principle of noninterference in internal affairs.

* * * * *

Since the end of World War II, Japanese leaders have been aware of the role that their nation can play as a link between the nations of the West and the countries of Asia. For such a role, Japan has a peculiar advantage not possessed by any other Asian nation.

Japan's cultural and traditional attitude has never been that of contempt or hatred of the Westerner or foreigners in general. The Japanese have not developed xenophobia or dislike of foreigners or foreign cultures. On the contrary, they have, through history, been admirers of foreign cultures, always looking to the outside world for something new, something good to emulate. Indeed, her history reflects this at every important turn, for Japan's cultural development and progress have been nurtured and nourished by importations from the outside, both from Asian countries and from the West.

Yet in spite of the strong admiration of the West, Japan has preserved her traditions and is in a position to see and act as an Asian nation. She is therefore able to understand the feelings of Asians and their problems far better than Westerners. Consequently, she is in a more advantageous position to be of effective assistance to the developing nations of Asia and Africa.

One hundred ten summers ago, a native of Newport, Rhode Island, Commodore Matthew Galbraith Perry of the United States Navy, opened the doors of Japan, which had been tightly closed for more than two centuries. And the half century of American-Japanese relations which followed was a most cordial relationship such as seldom seen in the history of intercourse between nations. The United States was, in effect, the guardian and Japan was her ward. Townsend Harris, the first Western diplomatic representative ever to be stationed in Japan, while representing the United States, had the interests of Japan always at heart and protected her whenever other Western nations tried to take advantage of her inexperience in diplomacy. The next half century which covered the first half of the 20th

century was unfortunately marred by suspicion, distrust, and rivalry ending in open hostilities. History has come a full cycle. In the third half century, which has only recently begun, and especially in the last ten years, the relations have never been closer between the two great nations on the opposite shores of the wide expanse of the Pacific Ocean, for they have become close partners in the Free World's efforts to stem communist aggression and encroachments on freedom and giving assistance to the developing nations of Asia. The preservation of peace and freedom and the democratic way of life which we uphold in the Free World in the long run will depend heavily on how well these two partners across the Pacific work in cooperation and collaboration. The feeling of mutual need between the two nations has never been stronger in the 110-year history of American-Japanese relations.

It is one of the most poignant ironies of the 20th century that the two countries that fought so ferociously in the Pacific as enemies have now become such close partners in the preservation of freedom against the threat of communist world revolution led by a former World War II ally of the United States. Japan's roles in Asia and in the Free World are inextricably tied to the goals of the United States and of the Western democracies.

Just how effectively Japan will play her roles will be determined, in the final analysis, by how completely the Western democracies accept her and treat her as a true partner sharing equal rights and equal responsibilities.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor Chitoshi Yanaga

PRESENT POSITION:

Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of
Graduate Studies on Eastern Asia, Yale University

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND:

University of Hawaii, 1928, B.A.; 1930, M.A.

University of California, 1934, Ph.D.

University of Tokyo, post-doctoral study, 1935-37 on a fellow-
ship, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS:

Instructor in Japanese history and government, University of
California, 1937-42

Director of Japanese Translation and Research, Office of War
Information, 1942-44

Far Eastern Adviser, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service,
F.C.C., 1944

Chief, Special Research Section, Research and Analysis, Far
East, Office of Strategic Services and Department of State,
1944-45

Yale University since 1945; Fulbright Research Professor,
Tokyo, 1955-56

PUBLICATIONS:

Author: *Japan since Perry*, 1945; *Japanese People and Politics*,
1956

Articles in *Encyclopedia Americana*, *Americana Annual*, *Grolier's
Encyclopedia* and in learned journals

MISCELLANEOUS:

Presently a member, Board of Directors, Association for Asian
Studies. Has lectured at: Naval War College, Army War College,
Royal Canadian National Defence College.

THE NATURE AND USE OF POWER AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON STATE GOALS AND STRATEGIES

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 25 September 1963

by

Dr. Hans J. Morgenthau

I am supposed to speak about the role of power in our political and military strategy. One might think that it should not be necessary to elaborate upon this topic since the role of power in our political and military strategy ought to be evident. However, this is not so for two reasons: one historic, and one having to do with the great revolutions through which our political and military strategy has been passing in recent times.

Historically, we have had a strange illusion about the role that power plays in foreign policy and military strategy. Until quite some time after the end of the Second World War it was still widely held in this country that a nation—even a great nation—had a choice between what is called power politics and a foreign policy which is free from the taint of power. I remember very vividly that when I used to talk and write about the balance of power, power politics, etc., before, during, and after the Second World War, people looked at me as a kind of perverse fellow who talked about things which really ought to be abolished, and which we had hopes of abolishing, but which certainly did not need to be understood. I remember very vividly that at a lecture I gave before the Foreign Policy Association in Milwaukee in 1943, I mentioned the likelihood that the present struggle for power might continue after the Second World War, and that the Soviet Union might then perhaps be the enemy, and that we might then have to oppose our present ally for the sake of the same balance of power for which we were fighting. The President of the Association, who became a good friend of mine, told me many years afterward that people came up to him after the lecture and expressed their concern about my being a Fascist agent! It was difficult for us, for historic reasons, to accept the proposition that an organic and inevitable relationship exists between the power of a nation and the standing of that nation among the nations.

Take, for instance, the attitude which many took for a long time towards the United Nations, derived from the idea that the United Nations was an alternative to traditional foreign policy. Many thought that the nation had a choice between the traditional foreign and military policies, on the one hand, and a United Nations policy, on the other. This idea was very long in being discarded. Thus we are justified on historic grounds, in view of a prejudice deeply rooted in the American folklore of politics against the recognition and the use of power, in discussing the topic assigned to me.

There is, of course, a much more profound and serious reason for discussing this topic, because it bears upon great theoretical and practical issues which have faced great nations since the beginning of history and which face us in particularly urgent and unprecedented ways under present world conditions.

Let me say first of all that traditionally a nation has at its disposal two different types of power--military and nonmilitary. While the nature of military power is obvious and does not need to be elaborated, the nature of nonmilitary power is in need of further explanation. For nonmilitary power encompasses the whole spectrum of activities which are conducive to changing the will of another individual or collectivity of individuals. All power, military or nonmilitary, serves one purpose--to change the will of another nation. What we want to do when we embark upon foreign policy, and what we want to do when we use the threat or the actuality of physical violence, is to change the will of the opponent. He wants to do something, or he is doing something which runs counter to our interests, and so we try, through the peaceful means of diplomacy or through the violent means of war, if need be, to change his mind.

It follows from this simple and obvious relationship between the means and the ends of foreign policy that military power receives its purpose and its function from the political objective of the nation on behalf of which it is employed. And again this is a simple, and so it seems, an obvious principle. But while it is simple and obvious in theory, it has by no means proven so in practice. For one can say that many nations, ours included, have made grievous mistakes in neglecting this relationship between military force and political objectives.

Let me give you as an example the military strategy of the Second World War as pursued by the United States, on the one

hand, and as recommended by Churchill and actually pursued by Stalin, on the other. We fought the Second World War for one single objective: to defeat the enemy as quickly, as thoroughly, and as cheaply in terms of human life as possible. This was a strictly military approach to the problem. There was no political context within which this military strategy could operate. When Churchill suggested at the beginning of 1945 that the allied armies go as far east as possible in Europe, that they should stay where they stood until the Soviet Union had complied with its part of the Yalta agreement, a very interesting exchange of wires occurred between Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, and Bradley, which to my mind clearly demonstrates the political vacuum within which our military strategy operated. Rejecting Churchill's proposals, the American generals, in the best tradition of the subordination of the military to the political authorities, declared that it was none of their business to take into consideration the political consequences of their military strategy. They had to win the war, and it was for others to worry about the political consequences. But there was nobody on our side who worried about the political consequences, and so we fought and won the war strictly on military grounds, with the disastrous political consequences of which we are aware today. Stalin, on the other hand, went as far west as he could and stayed there; and the division of Germany and of Europe, the fact that Berlin is an island in a Red sea, are the results of a politically oriented military strategy conducted by the Soviet government.

This concentration, on the part of the United States, upon the military aspects of military strategy without concern for the political consequences, is unfortunately not an isolated incident in the history of American thinking and practice. The First World War provides another example of the same kind of approach to the relationship between military strategy and political objectives. Here again we had one aim: to win the war, to get rid of Imperial Germany, to bring the boys home, and then to forget about the whole thing and return to isolation.

In other words, we have traditionally regarded war as a kind of interruption of the normalcy of peace, which has no organic relation with the peace that preceded it or with the peace that will follow it. In truth, of course, peace and war are organically connected, as foreign policy and military strategy are; they are not two separate self-sufficient technical departments. They are one whole, both serving the same objectives, each by means appropriate to itself. Yet this distinction between peace and war, foreign policy and military strategy, as though one were good and

the other bad, one being something you may indulge in innocently and the other being something you must shun aside and only take seriously in an emergency—this whole dichotomy is again deeply ingrained in our traditional thinking about foreign policy and military strategy. Only in recent years, under the impact of drastic and unmistakable experiences, have we come, at least in a certain measure, to recognize the intimate and organic relationship between peace and war, foreign policy and military strategy.

However, one ought not to be too optimistic about our ability to learn from experience, for there are more recent examples of the persistence of this compartmentalization of thinking and practice. Take, for instance, the comments which one hears from time to time about our policies in South Vietnam. Here again there is a tendency to separate military operations from the political context. People will say, 'Let's not worry about the political context, let's go on with the war.' But obviously you can go on with a war, with a chance of success, only if you have a political context which is promising in terms of your military objectives.

One could even mention, if one wanted to push the matter further, our overall alliance policy, as it has developed since the end of the Second World War, as an example of this tendency of looking at foreign policy as one subject and at military policy as another. Certainly many of our alliances have not been the result of a well-thought-out foreign policy, to which military considerations were subordinated, but they have been established and maintained in good measure as an end in itself. There was a time when we approached the problem of alliances as a stamp collector collects stamps, assuming that we are the better off the more allies we have. So we have had a tendency to collect allies regardless of our interests, regardless of the power considerations involved, regardless even of military advantage, and even oblivious of military liabilities some of those alliances entailed for us.

Let me now turn from this general consideration of the necessary subordination of military strategy to political policy to the great revolution which has occurred in this relationship and which is the result of the availability of nuclear weapons. Throughout history, from the very beginning to the end of the Second World War, there has always existed a rational relationship between violence as the means and the ends of foreign policy. That is to say, a statesman in the prenuclear age could, and actually did, calculate whether he could achieve his objectives by peaceful means, or whether he had to resort to the threat or the actuality

of violence. A statesman in that period was very much like a labor leader who must calculate whether he can achieve what he seeks by the peaceful means of collective bargaining, or whether he has to resort to industrial warfare in the form of a strike. Or, to use another comparison, a statesman who would choose war acted very much like a gambler who is willing to risk a tolerable fraction of his resources. If he wins the risks taken are justified by the gains made; if he loses he generally hasn't lost everything. Even a Hitler with unlimited objectives still remained within that rational tradition of the relationship between violence as a means and the ends of foreign policy. Even though Hitler lost his war for total stakes as completely as a war can be lost, Germany did not disappear from the map and is again today, only 18 years after the end of the Second World War, one of the great powers on the face of the earth.

The availability of nuclear power has changed this rational relationship. Imagine for a moment that a nuclear war would have to be fought over the Western presence in Berlin or over the Russian presence in Cuba, two (in this respect) similar situations, both lending themselves to the same kind of speculation. Certainly the objects of the war, West Berlin and Cuba, would be wiped from the face of the earth, and in all probability a belligerent in such a nuclear war would suffer intolerable and possibly definitive damage. This is the radical change, and I should say the only revolutionary change, which has occurred in the structure of international relations since the beginning of history. Considering the destructiveness of the means in relation to the ends, nuclear violence is no longer a rational means to the ends of foreign policy. This is not to say that nuclear war has become impossible. Unfortunately in foreign policy, as in human affairs in general, what is irrational has not of necessity also become impossible. It is quite possible that if the present trend continues, sooner or later a nuclear war might have to be fought. But we ought to be aware of the fact that such a war would have a function quite different from the function which conventional wars have performed: the latter were, in contrast to nuclear war, rational means to the ends of foreign policy.

The governments which are in the position to wage a nuclear war, the United States and the Soviet Union, are fully aware of this fact, and their awareness of this fact has led to a radical change in their use of power for their respective national purposes. We are here in the presence of a great paradox in that governments which in terms of their material power are infinitely more powerful

today than any government has ever been are much less able to use such power, or any effective power as a matter of fact, on behalf of their interests than were their much less powerful predecessors. Take again the examples of Berlin and Cuba.

In November 1958, Mr. Khrushchev presented the United States with what amounted to an ultimatum. He said, 'Get out of Berlin within six months, or else.' He repeated this procedure by telling us in the Spring of 1961, 'At the end of the year you will be out of Berlin, or else.' But there was no 'else'; we are still in Berlin in about the same position in which we were five years ago and Khrushchev did not follow up his threats with any kind of effective action. This kind of inconsistency, of loss of face, would have been inconceivable in the prenuclear age. No statesman could have survived it; he would have lost his reputation, if not his office. But in the nuclear age a statesman on whose decisions the fate of his own nation, if not of the civilized world, depends is fully aware of the enormous and intolerable risks which a threat of violence, nuclear or conventional, entails for all concerned. And so while statesmen still talk and threaten in prenuclear terms, when the chips are down or when they are afraid the chips might come close to being down, they pull back and do not dare to use violence of any kind.

Take our policy toward Cuba as it was revealed in the crisis of October 1962. We went a considerable distance on that road which might have led to nuclear war, but we stopped before we had reached what we had declared to be our objective—the elimination of the Russian military presence in Cuba—because we were afraid, rightly or wrongly, lest by going farther we would come too close to nuclear war. I have gone on record as believing that it was the wrong decision to stop at this point. But I am fully aware of the enormous responsibilities which the President had in this matter, of the great uncertainties that faced him, and of the very grave consequences which, one way or other, would flow from his decision. In any event, rightly or wrongly, the President stopped at a certain point and refrained from using the power at our disposal because he believed that to use that power to the full would create the intolerable risk of nuclear war.

I must be satisfied with giving you these few examples. One could write a history of post-World War II diplomacy in terms of the limiting influence which the availability of nuclear power has had upon the foreign and military policy of nuclear nations. As a matter of fact, nuclear powers are much more restrained in their

use of violence—any kind of violence, conventional or nuclear—than are nonnuclear powers. Great Britain and France dared to go to war in 1956 over Suez. The Soviet Union and the United States stopped them. Again I have been very critical of our diplomacy in this affair. But it is important to recognize in the context of this discussion that that diplomacy derived again from the recognition that the use of any violence, even of the conventional kind, carries within itself the risk of escalating into the use of nuclear violence. For another example, take our strategy in the Korean War. That strategy was, of course, primarily dominated by that same fear of going too far in the use of conventional violence and thereby conjuring up the spectre of nuclear war.

Here, then, is the paradox: the nuclear powers are infinitely more powerful than any nation has ever been, but they are much less able, because of the disproportionate relationship between the magnitude of their power and the objectives of foreign policy, to use their power for the purposes of their foreign policies.

Another new dimension in the use of power on behalf of the objectives of nations has to do with the emergence of so-called new and uncommitted nations, for whose allegiance the great powers compete. Obviously, such a nation—and you can take any new African nation that comes to mind—is under typical circumstances not susceptible to military threats or diplomatic inducements and pressures. If you want to prevent such a nation from going over to the communists, it will do you no good to threaten it with military violence, nor will it do you any good to use the traditional methods of diplomatic pressure or diplomatic promises. Both methods are obviously inadequate to bring about the objective, which is to keep the uncommitted nation at least in a detached neutral position and at best to bring it over to the Western side. Thus both sides in the cold war have embarked upon a policy, which is not new in its essence but certainly novel in the extent to which the national resources have been committed to its support, and which is generally called the policy of foreign aid. That is to say, we are trying to achieve our objectives with regard to the new and uncommitted nations through the methods of technical and economic aid and all kinds of psychological methods related to them.

Foreign aid is a very important new element in our armory of foreign policy, and it is also, as you well know, an unpopular element. Its unpopularity, it seems to me, is intimately related to the intellectual and practical confusion which has beset it in the

past. This observation is related to what I have said before about the tendency toward the self-sufficiency of separate technical enterprises in our foreign and military policy. For we have tended to look at foreign aid, too, as such a self-sufficient technical enterprise, this time of an economic nature. We have thought that a nation is underdeveloped because it is lacking in capital and technological know-how. So give it capital and technological know-how and you will put it on the road to economic development.

It has, at least I hope, by now become clear to us that economic development is an infinitely more complex phenomenon than is indicated by these relatively simple remedies. In fact, it requires not only strictly economic and technological remedies, but is predicated first of all upon certain preeconomic rational and moral factors. In other words, many underdeveloped nations are underdeveloped not because they are lacking in capital and technological know-how, but they are lacking in capital and technological know-how because they are intellectually and morally underdeveloped. I have put it in a kind of epigrammatic statement, which has been widely quoted, by saying in an article, 'As there are bums and beggars, so there are bum and beggar nations.' If you go to the Bowery in New York and give economic aid to one of the men you meet there at the curb, it is very unlikely that you will put any of them on the road to economic development. Indeed, you will put them on the road to increased consumption of alcoholic beverages. For their deficiency which has prevented them from making an economic success of their lives is not the lack of capital; it is rather a moral and intellectual deficiency which has made them what they are. And so it is with certain nations.

Certain nations are in a state of lethargy and find themselves not only in a precapitalistic, but prerational stage of development to such an extent that no amount of money and technological know-how is likely to put them on the road to economic development. Insofar as such development is possible at all, it will come about slowly and painfully through a moral and intellectual transformation from within, but not through outside intervention. Take as one example the phenomenon of saving, which for us is an obvious and almost natural element in economic development—to save either for a future emergency or for the purpose of profitable investment. But this very concept of saving, the idea of what saving is all about, is alien to hundreds of millions of people and to most of those who make up the populations of underdeveloped nations. You may perhaps be acquainted with the story of the

Indian porter who refused to carry another suitcase because he had already eaten that day. Where one encounters this kind of moral attitude toward a fundamental economic problem, one is unable to promote economic development, no matter how much money is spent, no matter how much effort is made.

I would also say that one of the great misunderstandings and one of the main sources of disappointment has been the assumption that foreign aid is primarily aimed at economic development, and that it is a kind of charitable enterprise through which we extend certain public welfare programs from the domestic onto the international scene. This is by no means so. Most of what we call foreign aid has nothing to do with economic development. Much of it is military aid, and much of it is what was called, in less delicate periods of history, bribery; that is to say, you buy a government, either lock, stock, and barrel or for a specific purpose.

Until the beginning of the 19th century, such practices were performed quite openly. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Basel of 1795, by which Prussia withdrew from the war against France, the Prussian Minister Hardenberg received from the French government valuables worth 30,000 francs and complained of the insignificance of the gift. In 1801, the Margrave of Baden spent 500,000 francs in the form of 'diplomatic presents,' of which the French Foreign Minister Talleyrand received 150,000. It was originally intended to give him only 100,000, but the amount was increased after it had become known that he had received from Prussia a snuffbox worth 66,000 francs as well as 100,000 francs in cash.

What was done until about 150 years ago openly, without concealment or pretense, we do today more subtly. We send all kinds of missions to certain foreign countries to reform everything from A to Z; but what we are actually doing is to stuff the coffers of the ruling group with dollars in support of our foreign policies. I am not arguing against the practice itself. I only argue against the pretense and against the waste of money which that pretense involves. Certainly we could buy certain governments for a fraction of the price we are paying if we knew what we were doing.

Another type of foreign aid is what you might call prestige aid. It has nothing to do with economic development either. Governments of many underdeveloped nations, especially when they are new ones, must have an airline of their own. They can't manufacture airplanes; they can't service them; they can't fly them.

But they must have their national colors and coat of arms painted on the fuselage. A steel mill was until recently a status symbol for the underdeveloped nations. Now it is being replaced by the atomic reactor. More often than not, the airline or the steel mill has nothing to do with economic development. They are symbols of having arrived in the 20th century; they are mere status symbols. Foreign aid supporting such enterprises is political in nature and has nothing to do with economic development. Again I want to say that I am not opposed to such measures *per se*, but that one has to know what one is doing if one wants to be successful and if one wants to do it as rationally and cheaply as possible.

I should say that, in certain instances at least, the Russians have been much more successful in the subordination of economic aid to political purposes than we have been. I only need to remind you of the famous case of the paving of the streets of Kabul, which we refused to do on sound economic grounds and which the Russians did for political reasons. On the other hand, the Russians have harmed themselves enormously in Africa because of their commitment to Marxism. So we have had our handicaps and the Russians have had theirs. But while we have not the possibility nor the interest to do anything about the handicaps of the Russians, we can do something about ours.

Here again I come back to what I have said before concerning the relationship between military and political policy. The same holds true of all aspects of what you might call the security policies of a nation, and it holds true of economic policy as well. What we do in the economic field, what we do in the field of political warfare, propaganda for instance, must be subordinated to the overall political objectives of the nation. Only when we do this will we be able to establish the vital link between political objectives and the means, peaceful or military, at their disposal. Only then will we be able to establish a balance between our objectives and the means at their disposal.

There have been periods in our history, and I am thinking particularly of the period between the First and Second World Wars, when the objectives we set ourselves for our foreign policies were far below the means which were at our disposal. We emerged from the First World War as potentially the most powerful nation on earth, yet our influence was that of a third-rate power in the concert of the nations. In order to stop the Japanese expansion into China, we proclaimed the so-called Stimson Doctrine of the nonrecognition of territorial acquisitions

by violence. This doctrine did not stop any Japanese soldier in Manchuria or China proper, and that policy has been correctly called a policy of making faces, that is, a completely ineffective policy.

There is another extreme to which a great power can go, and that is to set itself objectives which it cannot achieve with the means at its disposal. Of that extreme, Hitler's Germany is the prime example in recent history. The objectives Hitler set himself went far beyond the means available. There are, then, two great pitfalls, besides the others I mentioned, which a great power must try to avoid: to set itself objectives which fall short of what it can achieve, and to set itself objectives which go beyond what it can achieve. Balance between means and ends, balance between the purposes of a nation and the power which a nation has at its disposal—this balance is the ultimate ideal goal which those responsible for foreign policy and military strategy must try to achieve.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Dr. Hans J. Morgenthau

Dr. Hans J. Morgenthau, Professor of Political Science and Modern History, University of Chicago, and the Director of its Center for Study of American Foreign and Military Policy, was born in Coburg, Germany. He came to the United States in 1937 and became a naturalized citizen in 1943. He studied at the Universities of Berlin, Frankfort, and Munich, 1923-27; received the J.U.D. (1929) from the University of Frankfort, and did graduate work at the Graduate Institute for International Studies, Geneva, 1932.

He was admitted to the bar in 1927; practiced law, 1927-30; served as assistant to law faculty, University of Frankfort, 1931; was acting president, Labor Law Court, Frankfort, 1931-33; instructor in political science, University of Geneva, 1932-35; professor of international law, Institute of International and Economic Studies, Madrid, Spain, 1935-36; instructor in government, Brooklyn College, 1937-39; assistant professor of law, history and political science, University of Kansas at Kansas City, Missouri, 1939-43; and visiting associate professor of political science, University of Chicago, 1943-45, associate professor, 1945-49, and professor since 1949. He has been Director of the Center for Study of American Foreign and Military Policy since 1950.

Dr. Morgenthau has been visiting professor, University of California, 1949; Harvard University, 1951; Northwestern University, 1954; and Columbia and Yale Universities, 1956-57. He has been visiting lecturer at the Naval War College, Air War College, and Army War College since 1950. He served as a consultant, Department of State, 1949-51. He was associated with the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study, 1958; with the Foreign Service Educational Foundation, 1959-60; and was visiting professor of government, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1960-61.

He has been author or coauthor of numerous books in the field of political science since 1929. Among the latest are: *Scientific Man vs Power Politics* (University of Chicago Press, 1946); *Politics among Nations* (New York, Knopf, 3rd ed., May 1960); *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York, Knopf, 1951); and

Dilemmas of Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1958); *The Purpose of American Politics* (New York, Knopf, 1960); and *Politics in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962). He is editor of *Germany and the Future of Europe* (University of Chicago Press, 1951) and *Principles and Problems of International Politics* (with Kenneth W. Thompson) (New York, Knopf, 1950).

He is contributor of articles in his field to numerous professional journals, including *American Political Science Review*, *The Annals*, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, *Commentary*, *Commonweal*, *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, *Political Quarterly*, *Review of Politics*, *Western World*, *World Politics*, *Yale Review*, *New York Times Magazine* and *Daedalus*.

RECOMMENDED READING

The evaluations of books listed below include those recommended to resident students of the Naval War College. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find them of interest.

The inclusion of a book or article in this list does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein. They are indicated only on the basis of interesting, timely, and possibly useful reading matter.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D.C.

Pearl Harbor Naval Base Library
Navy No. 128
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96614

Library
U.S. Naval Station
San Diego, California 92136

Library, ALSC
U.S. Naval Station
Box 169, Navy 926
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California 96910

Library
U.S. Naval Station
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

BOOKS

Smith, Jean E. *The Defense of Berlin*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. 431p.

Mr. Smith has written a detailed account of the Berlin situation covering the period from 1945 to May 1962. The book is easily read, thoroughly documented and represents the most comprehensive review of the subject known to this reader. As such, it is an excellent research source within itself and it also contains a very complete bibliography which will be of great value to those interested in more extensive research. The author is frankly critical of the United States policy in response to Soviet and East German pressures, particularly during the post-Dulles period. In recounting the events and developments surrounding the Berlin situation, this book clearly highlights the tremendous impact that United States policies and politics have on the national and international affairs of our major allies, and the difficulties inherent in our alliance strategy. This book is highly important reading for anyone interested in Berlin specifically and in post-World War II United States foreign policy generally.

Dulles, Allen W. *The Craft of Intelligence*. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 277p..

Mr. Dulles considers that intelligence is probably the least understood and most misrepresented of the professions. Calling upon the knowledge he has acquired as diplomat, lawyer, and intelligence officer, and from 11 years with the Central Intelligence Agency, the author relates all that can properly be told about intelligence as a vital element of the structure of our government in this modern age. Tracing intelligence efforts from the 5th century B.C. to the present, with emphasis on United States intelligence efforts, Mr. Dulles introduces the reader to some obscure spies and espionage organizers, as well as some of the famous ones. He leads us through many of the fascinating intelligence events of World War II, and presents his views on most of the recent roles played by the intelligence community in the Bay of Pigs, the U-2, and the Cuban missile crises. The author compares and evaluates United States and Soviet intelligence techniques, agents, collection, and deception. He considers communist intelligence to be our main opponent. Mr. Dulles has some concrete proposals for dealing with the problems associated with security in a free society. He believes that it is essential to our future that intelligence continue to function and fulfill a vital role in an era of continuing danger.

Warner, Denis A. *The Last Confucian*. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 274p.

This book is an interesting, objective, and analytical review of the confusing situation in Southeast Asia. The author is a veteran Australian journalist who knows the area and the people through years of on-the-scene observing and reporting. He knows personally many of the principal characters in the current Vietnamese-Laotian-Thai-Cambodian drama. Written in the easy-to-read style of a first-rate reporter, the book is excellent background material for the contemporary news reports coming out of the area. For the most part it is a not-very-optimistic report on how the communist plans to destroy Western power in the region are being carried out. The main interest and value of this book are that it tells the story of the struggle in Indo-China as viewed by the villager. This is a viewpoint which Mr. Warner thinks has been overlooked by all except the communists. However, he has hopes that the West is correcting the emphasis of its efforts so that the communists will not continue to be the only people working at the grass roots. If the West fails to revise its policy, Mr. Warner says, it will deserve the defeat that it is bound to get.

Chamberlin, William H. *The German Phoenix*. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1963. 309p.

This is a highly readable survey of the Federal Republic of Germany in which Mr. Chamberlin describes West Germany's phoenix-like economic and political rise from the ashes of World War II. In a brief historical sketch, he traces Germany's cultural and political inheritance, her defeat in World War II, and her rapid upward climb under the Allied Occupation. He then explores the West Germany of today in terms of its economic accomplishments, its political figures, and its spiritual forces. Mr. Chamberlin sees the emergence of a free, prosperous, and anticommunist Germany as a victory for United States foreign policy. Since American policy toward Germany in the early years of the Occupation was particularly inept, this ultimate victory is remarkable. The author concludes that the prospect for increasing friendship and mutual understanding between the United States and the Federal Republic is favorable. Based on extensive travels in Germany and on interviews with leading German personalities, as well as with obscure Germans of all classes, this book is a timely and lively look at an important ally.

Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1890-1939*. New York: Viking, 1963. 421p.

This book is the first volume of the 3-volume biography of General George Catlett Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 1939 to the end of World War II. The volume traces in a superb and detailed manner the progress of the General from childhood to the time he assumed the duties as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in 1939. The reader is given a perceptive insight into the training and character of General Marshall, as well as a view of the old Army with its many problems and changes during this period. The volume highlights his studies at Virginia Military Institute and his duty as a student and instructor at Ft. Benning and Ft. Leavenworth. This formal schooling, coupled with extensive staff and field duty in the Philippine Islands during the Spanish-American War, in World War I, in China, and on numerous tours with National Guard units, developed an officer qualified for duties far beyond those normally undertaken by one of his rank. This book is a most scholarly account of the trials and tribulations of an exceptional Army officer during the period prior to 1939, and clearly demonstrates how the right man got to the right place at the right time.

Monroe, Elizabeth. *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. 254p.

'The British Empire is preeminently a great Naval, Indian and Colonial power,' read the report that inaugurated the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1904. The word 'Indian' explains the reason why the British went into the Middle East in the first place. They saw the Middle East as a shield against Russian expansion. *Britain's Moment in the Middle East* traces British Middle Eastern policy and actions from that beginning. For those who wonder why Lawrence was in Arabia in the first place, this book provides the answer; for those who are puzzled by the intricacies of the influence of oil on foreign policy, this book provides much information; and for those seeking background on recent occurrences in the Middle East, this book is invaluable. The volume is a gold mine of information for the serious student of Middle Eastern affairs—it ranges from the Boer War to the Suez Crisis, from London to Moscow by way of Delhi, and from Zionism to the Arab League. This is not a book to be picked up and devoured at one sitting; the story it tells is far too complicated and requires too much thought for that. For the person interested in the Middle East, however, and especially for military men desiring some background on this area, the work is very valuable.

— NOTES —